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A normative argument against explosion 
Mark Pinder 
University of Birmingham 
 
[This is the accepted version of the following article: Mark Pinder, 2017, A normative argument 
against explosion, Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6(1): 61–70, which has been published in final 
form at http://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.234.]  
Abstract. One strategy for defending paraconsistent logics involves raising ‘normative arguments’ 
against the inference rule explosion. Florian Steinberger systematically criticises a wide variety of 
formulations of such arguments. I argue that, for one such formulation, Steinberger’s criticisms fail. 
I then sketch an argument, available to those who deny dialetheism, in defence of the formulation in 
question.  
Keywords. Paraconsistent logic. Explosion. Normative. Reason. Bridge principle. 
1. Normative arguments against explosion 
Paraconsistent logics reject the following inference rule.   
 
Explosion (EXP): P, ~P ⊨ Q. 
 
Such logics are typically packaged with dialetheism—the view that there are true contradictions—but 
need not be. The dialetheist may endorse EXP if she is willing to countenance the truth of every 
proposition;1 and the non-dialetheist may have independent reasons for denying EXP.2  
                                                     
1 For an example of trivialism, see Azzouni 2013. 
2 For example, that conclusions ought to be relevant to premises; e.g. Anderson and Belnap 1975. 
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A popular strategy for defending paraconsistent logics involves raising normative 
considerations against EXP. Consider this argument. 
 
One ought to believe the logical consequences of one’s beliefs. But, in fact, most people have 
inconsistent beliefs. Supposing EXP (for reductio), it follows that most people ought to 
believe Q, where Q is any proposition whatsoever. But, for any given person, there is some 
proposition that she ought not to believe. It follows from the preceding that, for some R, she 
ought to believe R and ought not to believe R. This is a contradiction. Thus, by reductio ad 
absurdum, EXP is not a valid rule of inference. 
 
Call this a normative argument (against explosion).  
Let the bridge principle in such an argument be the premise that connects logical 
consequence with normative claims about beliefs. The bridge principle in the above is: 
 
B1: One ought to believe the logical consequences of one’s beliefs.  
 
There are at least two serious objections to B1. The first is due to Harman 1984. Suppose that one’s 
current beliefs have an absurdity as a logical consequence. Then, given B1, one ought to believe the 
absurdity. But that consequence is false: one ought rather to revise an antecedent belief. The second is 
due to Broome 1999. Each proposition is a logical consequence of itself. So, given B1, one ought to 
believe everything that one does in fact believe. But that consequence is false: sometimes one forms 
beliefs without, say, taking due care as to whether the belief is true.  
 Building on work by MacFarlane (2004), Florian Steinberger (2016) investigates whether 
there is a successful formulation of the normative argument against explosion by systematically 
considering alternative bridge principles. He argues not, concluding that ‘there is no successful way of 
reformulating the normative argument’ (p. 387). 
Steinberger’s criticisms are largely successful, but fail for one particular bridge principle. I 
introduce the bridge principle in §2, respond to Steinberger’s criticisms in §3, and argue that the 
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bridge principle can be independently justified in §4. In §5, I sketch an argument, available to non-
dialetheists, in defence of the corresponding formulation of the normative argument. 
I do not aim to show that the relevant formulation of the normative argument is successful: 
such a conclusion could not be established in a single article. But, nonetheless, I provide a clear 
strategy for developing it into a compelling case against EXP, at least in the eyes of the non-
dialetheist. Given that (i) normative arguments have recently received substantial criticism (especially 
in Steinberger 2016), and (ii) most non-dialetheists endorse EXP, the strategy is important. 
2. The B2-formulation 
The bridge principle in question is this: 
 
B2: If P1, …, Pn ⊨ Q, then if S believes all the Pi, S has (defeasible) reason to believe Q. 
 
(Following MacFarlane, Steinberger calls it (Cr+).) Using B2, the normative argument is formulated 
as follows (Steinberger 2016: 389, 401, 403). For some ordinary person S, and inconsistent set of 
propositions Φ: 
 
(a) EXP is valid. [Hypothesis, for reductio.] 
(b) S believes each member of Φ. [Premise] 
(c) If P1, …, Pn ⊨ Q, then if S believes all the Pi, S has (defeasible) reason to believe Q. [B2] 
(d) Even if S’s set of beliefs is inconsistent and any proposition whatsoever is entailed by it 
(courtesy of EXP), there are propositions that S has no reason whatsoever to believe. 
[Premise]  
(e) S has no reason whatsoever to believe R. [From (d).] 
(f) Φ ⊨ R. [From (a).] 
(g) S has (defeasible) reason to believe R. [From (b), (c) and (f).] 
(h) Contradiction. [From (e) and (g).] 
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(i) EXP is invalid. [From (a)–(h) by reductio.] 
 
Call this the B2-formulation of the normative argument.  
 Throughout this paper, I take it as common ground that many ordinary people have 
inconsistent beliefs.3 As such, I assume (b) without argument. Moreover, as Steinberger’s principal 
criticisms concern (c), i.e. B2, I provisionally assume (d)—although I drop this assumption in §5. 
As Steinberger notes (2016: 402), B2 avoids both Harman’s and Broome’s criticisms: it does 
not yield any consequences about what one ought to believe at all. However, Steinberger raises two 
alternative objections to B2: first, that it is implausibly strong; second, that it is implausibly weak. 
3. Steinberger’s criticisms of B2  
First, Steinberger writes that, 
if [B2] is philosophically tenable, […] then I do have a reason (albeit a defeasible one) for 
believing any logical consequence of my beliefs. And so, saying that I have no reason 
whatsoever to believe P given my background beliefs and my evidence is to say that I could 
not possibly believe (not merely that I do not have any reason to believe) any set of 
propositions that entails P (otherwise, by [B2], I would have a reason to believe P). But that 
seems implausibly strong. (2016: 403) 
As I understand it, the objection is this. Hold S’s background beliefs and evidence fixed. Then, B2 
implies (1): 
 
(1) If S could believe a set of propositions that entails P, then S has a (defeasible) reason to 
believe P. 
 
                                                     
3 See Steinberger 2016: 392–395. 
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and (1) entails the implausibly strong conclusion that ‘saying that S has no reason whatsoever to 
believe P is to say that S could not possibly believe any set of propositions that entails P’. Thus, 
according to Steinberger, B2 is implausibly strong.  
 I agree that the conclusion—saying that S has no reason whatsoever to believe P is to say that 
S could not possibly believe any set of propositions that entails P—is implausibly strong. However, I 
disagree with Steinberger’s suggestion that this is a problem for B2: pace Steinberger, B2 does not 
imply (1). B2 underpins an inference from what S does believe to what her (defeasible) reasons are; it 
does not permit any inferences at all from what S could believe. To obtain (1) from B2, Steinberger 
would require an auxiliary premise: 
 
(2) If S could believe a set of propositions that entails P, then S does believe a set of propositions 
that entails P. 
 
However, Steinberger would not be entitled to assume (2). The most plausible defence of (2) appeals 
to two claims: that S has inconsistent beliefs; and that EXP is valid. (These two claims jointly imply 
the truth of (2)’s consequent, and thus of (2).) But Steinberger is not entitled to assume that EXP is 
valid, as this is precisely what is at issue.  
The only consequence of B2 in the vicinity of (1) is: 
 
(3) If S could believe a set of propositions that entails P, then S could have (defeasible) reason to 
believe P. 
 
But (3) is unproblematic. So Steinberger’s first objection fails. 
 The second objection is that B2 is implausibly weak.  
[B2] in no way requires of me that I should revise my beliefs in light of their consequences. 
Surely, though, logical coherence does demand that I modify my belief set so as to avoid 
blatant inconsistencies. (Steinberger 2016: 404) 
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This objection presupposes that B2 is intended to capture the normative status of logic. However, this 
presupposition is not required for the B2-formulation of the normative argument to go through: on the 
natural reading of (d)—on which ‘no reason whatsoever’ implies that there is no reason logical or 
otherwise—there is no equivocation. I return to this point in the next section. 
 But even if B2 is intended to capture the normative status of logic, the objection fails. As 
Steinberger recognises,4 B2 makes no claim of completeness: it is compatible with there being 
additional bridge principles that, with B2, jointly capture the normative status of logic. 
 Consider Steinberger’s claim that B2 does not capture the demand that one modify one’s 
belief set to avoid blatant inconsistencies. First, note that ‘demand’ may be too strong. Suppose that 
Mike is deeply conflicted about science and religion, resulting in an inconsistent belief set—say, 
because he takes there to be overwhelming evidence that there is no god, but takes himself to feel an 
emotional connection to a personal god. Even if logic generates a strong reason for Mike to revise his 
beliefs, it is at least plausible that that reason is defeasible: if both his evidence and emotional 
connection are sufficiently strong, then perhaps Mike has overriding reason to retain his inconsistent 
beliefs. It is plausible, then, that logic does not demand all-things-considered that an inconsistent 
belief set be revised, but merely provides a (defeasible) reason, however strong, to do so. 
 Now, modifying a belief set to avoid inconsistencies can require ceasing to believe, but B2 
only generates reasons to believe. Thus, B2 needs to be supplemented with a principle that generates 
reasons not to believe. For example: 
 
B3: If P1, …, Pn ⊨ Q, then if S believes all the Pi, S has (defeasible) reason not to believe ~Q. 
 
Suppose, then, that I believe P and Q, and learn that P⟷~Q. Given B2, I have (defeasible) reason to 
believe each of ~P, ~Q, and ~(P⟷~Q). Given B3, I have (defeasible) reason not to believe each of 
P, Q, and P⟷~Q. These reasons do not themselves tell me which belief(s) I ought to revise, but 
merely that I have reason to revise my belief set in one (or more) of the prescribed ways.  
                                                     
4 He writes: ‘The solution, therefore, cannot lie with [B2] (at least not taken on [its] own)’ (2016: 404). 
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 What I ought to do is determined by the relative strengths of my other reasons. If I have better 
reasons to believe Q and P⟷~Q than to believe P, then I may have overriding reason to revise the 
belief that P: I ought to cease believing that P and form the belief that ~P. If I have equal reason to 
believe Q and P, and a better reason to believe P⟷~Q, then I may have overriding reason to cease 
believing Q and P (but not to form any beliefs). This is all as it should be: in general, logic alone 
cannot find the false proposition in an inconsistent set. 
 So, although B2 on its own might be implausibly weak, it can be supplemented with other 
bridge principles. For example, together, B2 and B3 generate reasons to revise an inconsistent belief 
set, thereby avoiding ‘blatant inconsistencies’. Perhaps other bridge principles would also be required 
to fully capture the normative status of logic. Either way, the plausibility of B2 does not turn on its 
being complete. So Steinberger’s second objection fails. 
4. An independent justification of B2 
As noted above, however, the B2-formulation of the normative argument goes through regardless of 
whether B2 captures the normative status of logic. To obtain a contradiction, B2 need merely state that, 
in the relevant circumstances, S has a (defeasible) reason of some kind to believe Q. Call that the 
neutral reading of B2.  
On the neutral reading, B2 can be independently justified. Consider the following principles: 
 
P1: S is entitled to take the contents of S’s beliefs as evidence. 
P2: If P is a logical consequence of S’s evidence, then S has (defeasible) reason to believe P. 
 
Together, P1 and P2 imply that S is entitled to take herself to have (defeasible) reason to believe the 
logical consequences of her beliefs. And, plausibly, if one is entitled to take oneself to have 
(defeasible) reason to believe P, then one does in fact have (defeasible) reason to believe P: one’s 
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entitlement to take oneself to have a (defeasible) reason is itself a (defeasible) reason. If this is right, 
then B2 follows—and P1 and P2 jointly support B2.5 
P1 and P2 can be independently justified. For example, Timothy Williamson argues 
extensively for P1 (2007: ch. 7). Building on the view that evidence is propositional, he argues: first, 
that the contents of one’s knowledge constitutes one’s evidence; and, second, that one is entitled to 
take one’s beliefs as knowledge. Williamson puts his account to substantial philosophical work, 
explaining how thought experiments generate new knowledge and constructing a strategy for 
responding to any given form of scepticism. So there are established grounds for accepting P1.  
Consider P2. It should be read as neutral as to whether the (defeasible) reason is logical or 
otherwise. In addition, note that P2 states that S has a (defeasible) reason to believe the logical 
consequences of the propositions that constitute her evidence, not of the propositions for which she 
has evidence. For example, suppose that Sara is on a jury. Her evidence consists of two propositions: 
that Jan was seen walking suspiciously towards Mike; and that Mike’s bag was subsequently stolen. 
Then, according to P2, Sara has (defeasible) reason to believe that Jan was seen walking suspiciously 
towards the subsequent victim of a bag-theft. But P2 is silent about whether Sara has (defeasible) 
reason to believe, say, that Jan stole Mike’s bag: the latter is not a logical consequence of Sara’s 
evidence.  
The justification of P2 resides in the fact that evidence-based disciplines—the sciences, law, 
perhaps philosophy, etc.—go so far beyond it. In such disciplines, evidence is typically taken to 
confer (defeasible) reason to believe a proposition that the evidence merely supports. But it would be 
difficult to maintain such a claim while denying that we have (defeasible) reason to believe the logical 
consequences of our evidence. Our use of evidence in forming beliefs about the world, then, appears 
to presuppose P2. 
 If this is right, then, on a neutral reading, B2 can be independently justified.  
                                                     
5 Note that, if we identify one’s beliefs with one’s evidence, then P2 entails B2 directly. However, as an anonymous referee 
notes, the consequent non-factivity of evidence would perhaps be unappealing. 
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5. A defensible normative argument? 
Even if the above considerations are accepted, it does not automatically follow that the B2-formulation 
of the normative argument is defensible. For there is another premise, (d), which might be false.  
 I have heard the following argument raised against (d).  
 
If S has inconsistent beliefs and EXP is valid, then, for any given R, R is a logical 
consequence of S’s beliefs. But if R is a logical consequence of S’s beliefs then, given how 
easily (defeasible) reasons can be obtained, S does indeed have (defeasible) reason to believe 
R. It follows that, for every proposition, S has some reason to believe that proposition. So (d) 
is false.  
 
Call that the weak-reason argument. 
 The weak-reason argument straightforwardly fails. It assumes that EXP is valid in order to 
infer that R is a logical consequence of S’s beliefs, which is what makes it plausible that S has 
(defeasible) reason to believe R. However, the validity of EXP is precisely what is at issue, so cannot 
legitimately be assumed.6 
 To be clear, the specific wording of (d) does not permit the assumption that EXP is valid. 
Notice that (d) has the following form:  
 
(4) Even if P, Q, 
 
where P is the proposition that S’s set of beliefs is inconsistent and any proposition whatsoever is 
entailed by it (courtesy of EXP); and Q is the proposition that there are propositions that S has no 
reason whatsoever to believe. Now, (4) is stated in this way to highlight the fact that Q is intended not 
to rule out P; but (4) is in fact equivalent to (5): 
                                                     
6 Note that (d) is a premise, so the fact that the validity of EXP is hypothesised at (a) is irrelevant: premises must be justified 
independently of any hypotheses raised in the course of an argument. 
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(5) (If P, then Q) and (if not-P, then Q), 
 
which is equivalent to: 
 
(6) Q. 
 
So to argue against (4), one can argue: that P is true and Q false; or that not-P is true and Q false; or 
simply that Q is false. It is insufficient to assume P and argue on that assumption that Q is false.  
 I will now use these comments to sketch an argument in favour of (d). I reiterate two points. 
First, I do not take the following to establish (d): my ultimate aim is not to show that the B2-
formulation is successful and that we should therefore reject EXP. I aim to provide a clear strategy for 
providing a potentially compelling defence of the B2-formulation. Second, the argument in favour of 
(d) is available only to non-dialetheists. As such, one could straightforwardly resist the argument by 
endorsing dialetheism. However, for any theorist unwilling to countenance trivialism (the view that 
every proposition is both true and false), dialetheism would in turn lead to the rejection of EXP. 
 In light of the equivalence between (4) and (5), one can argue for (d) by defending, for some 
S, each of the following: 
 
(7) If S’s set of beliefs is inconsistent and any proposition whatsoever is entailed by it (courtesy 
of EXP), then there are propositions that S has no reason whatsoever to believe. 
(8) If there are some propositions not entailed by S’s set of beliefs (either because her belief set is 
consistent or because EXP is invalid), then there are propositions that S has no reason 
whatsoever to believe. 
 
Let us consider a case in which S is an ordinary person, Sandy. Suppose that Sandy’s beliefs are either 
jointly consistent, or else they are inconsistent in the following easily imaginable way: she has 
double-booked herself without (yet) realising it, and believes both that she is going to the theatre on 
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Monday night, and that she is not going to the theatre on Monday night. Moreover, let us suppose 
there is some proposition R, such that, except perhaps via her contradictory beliefs and EXP: R is not 
a logical consequence of Sandy’s beliefs; Sandy’s beliefs do not otherwise tell in favour or against R; 
and there are no other (say) practical, epistemic or moral reasons for Sandy to entertain or form a 
belief about R. For example, perhaps Sandy has no interest in the probability of coin tosses, and no 
reason to have such an interest, and R is the proposition: that the next coin tossed by the author of the 
present paper will land heads. Or perhaps Sandy has no interest in the history of Icelandic names or 
presidents, nor any reason to have such interests, and R is the proposition: that Sveinn Björnsson is a 
former President of Iceland. 
 Now, consider (8). Suppose that the antecedent is true: Sandy’s beliefs just happen to be 
jointly consistent. Then, it seems to straightforwardly follow from our description that Sandy has no 
reason whatsoever to believe R: her beliefs do not tell for or against R, and she has no other practical, 
epistemic or moral reasons to believe it. So there are propositions that Sandy has no reason 
whatsoever to believe. Hence (8). 
 Turn to (7). Suppose that the antecedent is true of Sandy: her set of beliefs is inconsistent 
(because of the double-booking) and any proposition whatsoever is entailed by that set (courtesy of 
EXP). But now, consider a proposition, R, such that the only candidate (defeasible) reason that Sandy 
might have to belief R is that it is entailed (courtesy of EXP) by her set of beliefs. As before, R might 
be that the next coin tossed by the author of the present paper will land heads, or that Sveinn 
Björnsson is a former President of Iceland. If Sandy has a (defeasible) reason to believe R, then this 
reason is courtesy of EXP.  
I will shortly sketch an argument that Sandy lacks a (defeasible) reason to believe R.7 To this 
end, we will need the following principle:    
                                                     
7 By appealing to B2, one can also argue that Sandy does have a reason to believe R. But this is irrelevant. Once the 
supposition of the antecedent has been discharged, such an argument could only establish that: if S’s set of beliefs is 
inconsistent and any proposition whatsoever is entailed by it (courtesy of EXP), then there are no propositions that S has no 
reason whatsoever to believe. But this is consistent with (7). (That is, ‘if P then Q’ is consistent with ‘if P then not-Q’: the 
conditionals jointly imply not-P.) 
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P3: A (defeasible) reason to believe that not-P is ipso facto a (defeasible) reason not to believe 
that P. 
 
This principle is highly plausible given a denial of dialetheism. Suppose that dialetheism is false: then 
there are no true contradictions, and propositions of the form P and not-P cannot be simultaneously 
true; so the truth of not-P precludes the truth of P; in which case a (defeasible) reason to believe the 
former is ipso facto a (defeasible) reason not to believe the latter. Hence P3.8 
 Let us sketch an argument, then, that Sandy lacks (defeasible) reason to believe R. Were 
Sandy to possess such a reason, it would be generated by a chain of reasoning along the following 
lines: 
 
(9) Sandy is going to the theatre on Monday night. 
Sandy is not going to the theatre on Monday night.  
 Therefore, R. 
 
By parity of reasoning, the following chain would thus likewise generate an equivalent reason to 
believe not-R: 
 
(10) Sandy is going to the theatre on Monday night. 
Sandy is not going to the theatre on Monday night.  
 Therefore, not-R. 
 
But then, by P3, (10) generates a (defeasible) reason not to believe R. That is: Sandy would have a 
(defeasible) reason to believe R only in virtue of a chain of reasoning that, by parity of reasoning, 
would likewise generate an equivalent (defeasible) reason not to believe R. Moreover, as nothing here 
                                                     
8 The argument fails for the dialetheist as, for her, the truth of not-P does not preclude the truth of P. 
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relies on the specific details of (9) and (10), the point generalises. For any (defeasible) reason that 
Sandy has to believe R, she likewise has (by parity of reason) an equivalent (defeasible) reason not to 
believe R. 
 We now have a choice. Either we say that Sandy has a pair of (defeasible) reasons—to 
believe R and not to believe R—that are equal and opposite, generating no resultant reason. (On this 
picture, neither the reason generated by (9) nor the reason generated by (10) is undermined by the 
other: both reasons are in play, they merely cancel each other out.) Or we say that Sandy has no 
(defeasible) reason to believe R, nor (defeasible) reason not to believe R.  
Which option should we take? Although there is clearly a conceptual difference between the 
two pictures, there is, it seems, no practical or epistemic difference whatsoever: Sandy’s overriding 
reasons will be precisely the same either way. So the phenomena do not dictate that we adopt either 
picture over the other. Nevertheless, in at least three respects, the latter picture is the more natural 
option. First, it is less cumbersome; the latter picture does not posit pairs of reasons that are 
superfluous to our understanding of Sandy’s situation, and is in that respect more elegant. Second, 
relatedly, it is potentially problematic to posit equal and opposite reasons that can never come apart, 
and thus cannot have a practical, epistemic, moral, etc., effect; after all, their practical, epistemic, 
moral, etc., import is their raison d’être. It is not clear that we are justified in positing reasons that 
cannot influence how we ought to act or think. Third, notice that in both pictures it will likely appear 
to Sandy that she has no reason whatsoever to believe R, and no reason whatsoever not to believe R. 
This appearance, however, is borne out only in the latter picture. Thus the latter picture is less 
revisionary, and accords more with first-person experience. 
Each of these considerations suggests that, at least to some extent, it is more natural to adopt 
the latter picture—on which Sandy has neither reason to believe R nor reason not to believe R. Of 
course, a detailed examination of these pictures would be required to provide a compelling case, and 
many questions remain. What exactly is it about chains of reasoning like (9) and (10) that means that 
they generate no reasons as opposed to equal and opposite reasons? Does the conclusion apply to 
other parallel chains of reasoning that do not invoke EXP? And, while we should expect there to be 
balanced reasons in at least some cases—such as cases in which the reasons can come apart—, must 
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equal and opposite reasons always be separable? I cannot explore such issues here. But nonetheless 
we have a clear strategy for arguing that, on present assumptions, we should adopt the latter picture—
the picture on which Sandy has neither reason to believe R nor reason not to believe R. 
 It would follow from the latter picture that, given our description of the case, Sandy does not 
have any reason whatsoever to believe R: the picture rules out the only candidate (defeasible) reasons. 
So, given that picture, there are propositions that Sandy has no reason whatsoever to believe. But that 
is the consequent of (7). So we have sketched an argument for the consequent of (7) from its 
antecedent. Hence, we have sketched an argument for (7). 
 Thus, we have sketched arguments for (7) and (8), and thus for (d). So, as things stand, we 
should conclude that the B2-formulation of the normative argument is defensible. 
6. Concluding remark 
There is a defensible formulation of the normative argument against explosion. I have responded to 
Steinberger’s objections to that formulation, and sketched defences of two key premises: the bridge 
principle B2; and the claim that, even if S’s set of beliefs is inconsistent and any proposition 
whatsoever is entailed by it (courtesy of explosion), there are propositions that S has no reason 
whatsoever to believe.  
 The arguments herein are not conclusive. But they provide a clear strategy for defending the 
B2-formulation of the normative argument, available to any non-dialetheist. In light of the recent 
criticisms levelled at normative arguments, this is important. Further examination is required before 
we can establish whether or not normative considerations tell in favour of paraconsistent logic. 
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